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Abstract  
We develop a small, open economy, two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and 
endogenous participation in a labor matching market. We analyze the implications of 
asymmetric market entry costs for the patterns of international trade and underemployment. 
Furthermore, we examine the welfare implications of trade liberalization and find that under 
certain conditions the patterns of trade are not optimal. We also examine the robustness of our 
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Establishing a competitive advantage in high-skilled sectors at the national level requires that a number of 
conditions must be met. The Ricardian theory of international trade emphasizes the need for technological 
know-how while from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model we learn that a sufficient endowment of skilled 
labor is necessary. While endowments and technologies are necessary pre-conditions they are by no 
means sufficient. Neoclassical trade theory is silent about the product and labor market institutions which 
play an important role in bringing the factors of production together. In particular, both the entry of workers 
into skilled labor markets and the establishment of new enterprises are costly. 
 
 In addition to market entry costs, we also need to consider frictions arising during the matching process 
of skills to firms. The decision of young people to acquire skills is going to depend, in addition to any direct 
costs, on their expectations about the probability of getting a job in the skilled sector and, given that they 
do find a job, on the quality of the match. Similarly, the decision of potential entrepreneurs to establish 
new firms will depend on their expectations about the future availability of skilled labor and the latter's 
level of skills. Furthermore, both parties decisions will depend on the allocation of the surplus generated 
by the match.  
 
These issues are well understood by labor economists. In this paper, we analyze some of the implications 
for international trade. We develop a two-sector model with three factors of production; namely, unskilled 
labor, skilled labor and entrepreneurial ability. One sector produces under a CRS technology a low-tech 
good that requires only unskilled labor. The second sector is a high-tech sector. To establish a production 
unit in that sector a skilled worker needs to be matched with an entrepreneur. Tthere are two type of 
agents, workers and entrepreneurs. Workers are distinguished by their potential ability as skilled workers 
and entrepreneurs by their potential ability to manage a firm. Both types must incur a fixed cost to enter 
the high-tech sector. To capture the notion of decentralized labor markets we assume random matching. 
Those agents on the long side of the market who cannot find a match find employment in the unskilled 
sector as do those agents who decided not to attempt to enter the matching market. The output of 
matched pairs is a function of the two partners' abilities. 
 
 Not surprisingly, we find that disparities in labor institutions become a source of comparative advantage. 
The exact patterns will depend not only on the costs of entering the skilled sector but also on the 
mechanism used for dividing the surplus. This suggests that in addition to traditional sources of 
comparative advantage, i.e. endowments and technologies, we also need to take into account those costs related to the acquisition of skills, those costs related to the creation of firms and the institutional structure 
of labor markets (unions, minimum wages, etc.).  
 
Our model generates either underemployment of skills or firm capacity that is not utilized depending of 
which side of the market is long. We demonstrate that the effect of trade liberalization on 
underemployment will depend on the pattern of trade. More specifically, we find that trade increases 
underemployment when the country has a comparative advantage in the high-tech sector. The level of 
underemployment will also depend on the sharing rule that divides the surplus between workers and 
entrepreneurs. Here, we find that the likelihood that the small-open economy has a comparative 
advantage in the high-tech sector is decreasing with the level of underemployment in autarky. 1. Introduction
Establishing a competitive advantage in high-skilled sectors at the national level requires
that a number of conditions must be met. The Ricardian theory of international trade
emphasizes the need for technological know-how while from the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
model we learn that a suﬃcient endowment of skilled labor is necessary. While endowments
and technologies are necessary pre-conditions they are by no means suﬃcient. Neoclassical
trade theory is silent about the product and labor market institutions which play an
important role in bringing the factors of production together. In particular, both the
entry of workers into skilled labor markets and the establishment of new enterprises are
costly.
When these costs are suﬃciently high they discourage market participation. For ex-
ample, Brixiova, Li and Yousef (2009) and Fan, Overland and Spagat (1999) suggest that
the reluctance of workers to enter skilled labor markets can explain shortages of skilled
labor in emerging economies and the consequent slow development of their private sector.
In contrast, relatively low skill acquisition costs and small labor market frictions can po-
tentially explain the phenomenon of overeducation and mismatch observed by researchers
in many European countries and Canada.1
Looking at the other side of the labor market, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer (2002) provide evidence that market entry costs incurred by start-up ﬁrms are
signiﬁcant and vary widely across countries. They ﬁnd that "The oﬃcial cost of following
required procedures for a simple ﬁrm ranges from under 0.5 percent of per capita GDP in
the United States to over 4.6 times per capita GDP in the Dominican Republic, with the
worldwide average of 47 percent of annual per capita income."
In addition to market entry costs, we also need to consider frictions arising during the
matching process of skills to ﬁrms. The decision of young people to acquire skills is going
to depend, in addition to any direct costs, on their expectations about the probability of
getting a job in the skilled sector and, given that they do ﬁnd a job, on the quality of
the match. Similarly, the decision of potential entrepreneurs to establish new ﬁrms will
depend on their expectations about the future availability of skilled labor and the latter’s
level of skills. Furthermore, both parties decisions will depend on the allocation of the
surplus generated by the match.
These issues are well understood by labor economists.2 In this paper, we analyze
some of the implications for international trade. We develop a two-sector model with
three factors of production; namely, unskilled labor, skilled labor and entrepreneurial
ability.3 One sector produces under a CRS technology a low-tech good that requires only
unskilled labor. The second sector is a high-tech sector. To establish a production unit
1See McGuiness (2006) for a review of this literature.
2For example, the need for coordination between skill acquisition and job creation in order to avoid
situations where the economy is locked in a low-skill/bad-job trap is emphasized by both Snower (1996)
and Redding (1996).
3As i m p l i ﬁed version of the model with one-sided uncertainty has been used by Bougheas and Riezman
(2007) to examine the relationship between the distribution of endowments and the patterns of trade and
by Davidson and Matusz (2006) and Davidson, Matusz and Nelson (2006) to examine redistribution policy
issues.
2in that sector a skilled worker needs to be matched with an entrepreneur. There are two
type of agents, workers and entrepreneurs. Both populations are heterogeneous. Workers
are distinguished by their potential ability as skilled workers and entrepreneurs by their
potential ability to manage a ﬁrm. Initially, each type must decide whether to enter the
matching market. Workers who decide to enter incur a ﬁxed cost related to the acquisition
of skills. Entrepreneurs who opt to enter incur a cost for establishing a new ﬁrm. To
capture the notion of decentralized labor markets we assume random matching. Those
agents on the long side of the market who cannot ﬁnd a match ﬁnd employment in the
unskilled sector as do those agents who decided not to attempt to enter the matching
market. The output of matched pairs is a function of the two partners’ abilities.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that disparities in labor institutions become a source of com-
parative advantage. The exact patterns will depend not only on the costs of entering the
skilled sector but also on the mechanism used for dividing the surplus. This suggests that
in addition to traditional sources of comparative advantage, i.e. endowments and tech-
nologies, we also need to take into account those costs related to the acquisition of skills,
those costs related to the creation of ﬁrms and the institutional structure of labor markets
(unions, minimum wages, etc.). Thus, our work is related to a group of papers suggesting
that diﬀerences in labor market rigidities across nations can be a major driving force of
comparative advantage (Krugman, 1995; Davis, 1998a; Davis, 1998d; Kreickemeier and
Nelson, 2006). Research in this area has paid particular attention to rigidities that have a
direct impact on wage formation. In contrast, our main interest is on cross-country diﬀer-
ences in (a) the costs of establishing new ﬁrms, and (b) the costs of entering skilled labor
markets. Finally, our work is also related to some recent theoretical work that explores the
implications of trade liberalization for inequality and labor market outcomes by developing
models with heterogeneous agents and endogenous participation.4
Our model generates either underemployment of skills or ﬁrm capacity that is not
utilized depending of which side of the market is long.5 We demonstrate that the eﬀect
of trade liberalization on underemployment will depend on the pattern of trade. More
speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that trade increases underemployment when the country has a com-
parative advantage in the high-tech sector. The level of underemployment will also depend
on the sharing rule that divides the surplus between workers and entrepreneurs. Here, we
ﬁnd that the likelihood that the small-open economy has a comparative advantage in the
high-tech sector is decreasing with the level of underemployment in autarky.
Most of our analytical results are derived from a benchmark version of our model that
includes a linear production technology and a one-to-one matching mechanism. In Section
4In Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2009) although both populations of ﬁrms and entrepreneurs
are heterogeneous it is only the participation of the second group that is derived endogenously. Egger
and Kreickemeier (2008) analyze a model with one heterogeous population and generalized endogenous
participation where agents in addition to their level of skills also decide in which sector to be employed.
In our model, both workers and entrepreneurs can choose whether or not to enter the matching market.
5Traditionally, matching models also include a search process thus generating unemployment (see, for
example, Davidson, Martin and Matusz, 1999; Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko, 2008; Felbermayr, Prat
and Schmerer, 2008; Felbermayr, Larch and Lechthaler, 2009). In this paper, we have implicitly set search
costs equal to zero to simplify our welfare analysis. Nevertheless, our model still generates equilibrium
underemployemnt.
32 we develop the model and examine the autarky case and then in Section 3 we open
the small-economy to international trade. In Section 4 we analyze two extensions of the
benchmark version of our model. First, we allow for complementarities in the production
function and we use this extended version to explore the welfare implications of trade
liberalization. We show that trade can potentially be welfare reducing. We also identify
conditions under which the patterns of international trade are not optimal. Second, we
also examine alternative matching mechanisms and show that are results are fairly robust.
We oﬀer some ﬁnal comments in Section 5.
2. The Closed-Economy Benchmark Model
The economy is populated by two types of agents and produces two goods. The two types
of agents, workers and entrepreneurs, are each of unit mass. The ﬁrst good, the numeraire,
is a high-tech product and its production requires the joint eﬀorts of an entrepreneur and a
worker. The second good is a primary commodity and all types of agents can produce one
unit should they decide to seek employment in that sector. Let P be its price in numeraire
units. All agents are risk neutral, form expectations rationally and have identical Cobb-
Douglas preferences allocating equal shares of their income on each good which implies
that real income is equal to nominal income divided by
√
P.6
The populations of both workers and entrepreneurs are heterogeneous. Workers are
diﬀerentiated by their ability α to work in the high-tech sector and entrepreneurs by
their ability z to manage in the high-tech sector. Both α and z are randomly drawn
from uniform distributions with support [0,1]. Both workers and entrepreneurs have to
incur a ﬁxed cost 0 <γ<1 and 0 <c<1, respectively, to enter the high-tech sector.
Entrepreneurs and workers that have incurred the ﬁxed entry costs are randomly matched.
If the two masses are not equal then unmatched agents enter the primary sector. Matched
pairs produce α + z units of the high-tech product.
To complete the description of the model we need to specify how matched pairs divide
their joint output. The division of surplus normally depends on the outside options of
the two parties and their relative bargaining power. Given that we have assumed away
any recontracting the outside options of the two sides are the same and equal to P the
income they will receive in their alternative employment option. For the moment we
assume that all pairs divide the surplus equally. As we will see below, assuming equal
division is analytically convenient and allows for analytical derivations. We will also explore
numerically the consequences of relaxing this restriction.7
Given that an agent’s expected payoﬀ is increasing in her own ability there exist two
cut-oﬀ ability levels α∗ and z∗ such that all workers with ability levels less than α∗ and
6Let X denote the level of consumption of the high-tech product, Y the level of consumption of the
primary commodity and I the level of nominal income. By maximzing
√
XY subject to I = PX+Y ,w e
obtain the solutions X = I
4P and Y = I
4, which after substituting them back in the utility function and
multiplying by 2 (because (a) the marginal utility of income is equal to 1, and (b) the measure of agents
is equal to 2) we obtain the solution in the text.
7Acemoglu (1996) also employs Nash bargaining in a random matching environment similar to the one
in this paper.
4all entrepreneurs with ability levels less than z∗ do not incur the high-tech sector entry
costs and ﬁnd employment in the primary sector. Thus, a mass of workers of 1 − α∗ and
a mass of entrepreneurs of (1−z∗) will enter the matching market. The decisions to enter
the high-tech sector, and thus the cut-oﬀ levels, will depend on each agent’s belief about
their likelihood of being matched. Thus, there are three cases to consider that correspond
to three potential rational expectations equilibria, namely matching market clearing
(1 − α∗)=( 1− z∗), surplus of entrepreneurs (1 − α∗) < (1 − z∗),a n dsurplus of
workers (1 − α∗) > (1 − z∗). The one that prevails will depend on the values of the
various model parameters. In the benchmark model, as we verify below, the equilibrium
type only depends on the relative size of the two entry costs. Thus, without any loss of
generality we assume that c<γin which case in equilibrium, as we verify below, there
will be a mass of entrepreneurs who incur the ﬁxed cost of entry but are not matched.
By deﬁnition an entrepreneur with ability z∗ is indiﬀerent between investing and market
search and directly entering the primary sector. Given that the income of this threshold
agent is equal to z∗ if matched and equal to P if unmatched, the equilibrium condition for


















P − c = P (1)
where 1−α∗
1−z∗ is the probability the entrepreneur is matched with a worker and z∗ + 1+α∗
2 is
equal to the expected output of a matched pair where the entrepreneur has ability equal
to z∗ keeping in mind that only those workers with ability higher than α∗ are attempting
to enter the high-tech sector. The ﬁrst term is multiplied by 1
2 which is equal to the share









− γ = P (2)
To close the model we need the equilibrium condition for one of the two goods markets.
Without loss of generality we focus on the market for the primary commodity
2α
∗ =
2α∗P − (α∗ − z∗)c +( 1− α∗)
¡
2+α∗+z∗




The left-hand side is equal to the gross supply of the primary commodity. All workers
that enter the matching market are matched and thus there are α∗ unmatched workers
which means there are α∗ unmatched entrepreneurs. Therefore, in total there is a mass
of 2α∗ agents that are employed in the primary sector and each produces one unit. The
right-hand side is equal to the gross demand. The speciﬁcation of preferences imply that
an agent with income y demands an amount
y
2P of the primary commodity. Furthermore,
risk-neutrality implies that the marginal utility of income is constant and thus, for the
derivation of the gross market demand it suﬃces to derive aggregate income and divide
it by 2P. Agents employed in the primary sector produce one unit and earn income P
and the ﬁrst term of the numerator on the right-hand side shows their gross income. The
5second term captures the entry costs of unmatched entrepreneurs. The ﬁnal term is equal
to the total income of matched pairs.8
In the next Proposition we verify that the solution of the above system is indeed a
rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under incomplete information if in the benchmark model γ>cthen
z∗ <α ∗.












− γ.T h e e q u a l i t y
can be written as 1
4(1 − α∗)(α∗ − z∗)=γ − 1−z∗
1−α∗c.F o r γ = c the last expression
can be written as 1
4(1 − α∗)2 = γ z∗−a∗
a∗−z∗.G i v e n t h a t γ>0 it follows that a∗ = z∗.
Next consider the case γ>cand let γ ≡ c + δ. Now we can write the equality as
1
4(1 − α∗)2 = cz∗−a∗
a∗−z∗ + δ
a∗−z∗.G i v e nt h a tδ>0 we have a∗ − z∗ > 0 which completes
the proof.
2.1. Entry Costs and the Autarky Price
Comparative advantage is completely determined by comparing the autarky price with
the foreign price and in the benchmark model the autarky price depends only on the two
entry costs. With that in mind, in this section, we examine how changes in these costs
aﬀect the autarky price. Notice that by setting both entry costs equal to 0 we can derive
a lower bound for the two cut-oﬀ levels α∗ and z∗.F r o m( 2) it is clear that in this limiting
case the two cut-oﬀ levels will be equal to 4P−1
3 and using (3)w eﬁnd out that they will
be greater than 1
2. This lower bound for the two cut-oﬀ levels will proved to be useful for
the derivation of the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the incomplete information case for γ>cwe have (a) dα∗
dγ > 0 ,( b )
dz∗
dc > 0 ,a n d( c ) dα∗
dc < 0 .
Proof See the Appendix
Changes in entry costs aﬀect the two thresholds through a number of distinct channels.
First, consider the eﬀect of worker entry cost on the entry of workers. It is not surprising
that an increase in γ discourages workers from participating in the matching market and
thus the overall eﬀect is to increase α∗. However, there is a second, smaller eﬀect due
to the choice of numeraire and works in the opposite direction. Other things equal, an
increase in any of the two entry costs decreases the amount available of the high-tech
8For the derivation of the last term, given that the output of a matched pair is equal to the sum of the
abilities of its members, it suﬃces to add individual abilities and subtract ﬁxed costs. Thus, we have that








zdz − (1 − α)(c + γ)
Notice that second term follows from random matching and z∗ <α ∗.
6product available for consumption and thus decreases P thus encouraging participation in
the labour market. For similar reasons the overall eﬀect of an increase in c is to discourage
the entry of entrepreneurs in the matching market, i.e. z∗ increases.
Next, consider the eﬀect of an increase in any of the two entry costs on the entry
decisions in the other side of the market. Payoﬀs depend on the abilities of both agents so
any increase in the threshold level of either workers’ or entrepreneurs’ entry costs increases
the expected payoﬀ of the other type of agent and thus their incentive to participate. In
t h ec a s eo fa ni n c r e a s ei nc on workers, the numeraire eﬀect mentioned above discourages
entry of entrepreneurs and thus increases the average ability of entrepreneurs in the market.
This has a positive eﬀect on workers’ payoﬀs thus providing even stronger incentives for
workers to participate, so an increase in the entrepreneur’s cost (c) will encourage entry
of workers (α∗ falls.)
Finally, the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nγ on the entrepreneurs’ entry decision is ambiguous
and the reason is the existence of a third indirect eﬀe c t . G i v e nt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nγ
discourages the entry of workers the likelihood of potential entrepreneurs being matched
declines which discourages this entry. Thus, the mass of high-tech ﬁrms will decline. It is
clear that this eﬀect is larger the wider the gap between the two entry costs. As Table 1
reveals, when the gap is small an increase in γ h a san e g a t i v ee ﬀect on z∗ but the eﬀect
becomes positive when the gap is large.
Table 1: Entry Costs, Matching Market Participation and the Autarky Price
c γ α∗ z∗ P
0.1 0.2 0.57 0.36 0.42
0.1 0.4 0.65 0.08 0.19
0.1 0.6 0.78 0.07 0.06
0.1 0.8 0.91 0.41 0.01
0.3 0.4 0.59 0.49 0.27
0.3 0.6 0.68 0.43 0.10
0.3 0.8 0.83 0.60 0.02
0.5 0.6 0.64 0.58 0.12
0.5 0.8 0.80 0.69 0.02
0.7 0.8 0.78 0.85 0.00
Next, we examine how entry costs aﬀect autarky prices.
Proposition 3 Let γ>c . Then, (a) dP
dc > 0 and (b) dP
dγ < 0.
Proof See the Appendix
The eﬀect of a change in c on the autarky price is positive. This is because the decline in
the participation rate by entrepreneurs increases the worker’s expected payoﬀ thus further
increasing their participation rate. Thus, since there is a surplus of entrepreneurs, the
supply of the high-tech product increases and this results in an increase in the autarky
price. An increase in γ discourages the participation of workers in the matching market
and as a consequence both the production of the high-tech product and the autarky price
decline.
73. International Trade
We now consider international trade. Let PT denote the international price. It is clear
that if PT >Pthe economy will export the primary commodity and if PT <Pthe
economy will export the high-tech product. The following Proposition follows directly
from Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 Suppose that γ>c .Then, other things equal, economies with higher labor
entry costs will export the primary commodity and economies with higher entrepreneur
entry costs will export the high-tech product.
Remark 1 In the statement of the Proposition the qualiﬁer ‘other things equal’ is there
to remind us that the pattern of international trade will depend not only on cross country
diﬀerences in the gap between the two costs but also on the levels. The prediction will be
reversed if we set entrepreneur entry costs higher than labor entry costs.
3.1. Underemployment and Trade
We know from the autarky case that when entry costs are asymmetric in equilibrium
there are some agents who entered the matching market but were not matched. The
total expenditure of unmatched agents on entry costs (α∗ − z∗)c provides a measure of
ineﬃciency. As the following proposition demonstrates the eﬀect of international trade on
ineﬃciency depends on the pattern of trade.9
Proposition 5 As the economy moves from autarky to free trade the measure of ineﬃ-
ciency declines when the economy exports the primary commodity and increases when the
economy exports the high-tech product.
Proof Setting P = PT, rearranging and totally diﬀerentiating equations (1)a n d( 2)w e








































































Suppose that P<P T. I nt h i sc a s et h ew o r l dp r i c ei sh i g h e rt h a nt h ea u t a r k yp r i c e
so that the economy exports the primary product and P will increase which will reduce
ineﬃciency according to the equation above.¥
The intuition for this result is that as trade increases from zero, if you export the
primary product then trade draws resources into that sector and out of the high-tech
sector. The high-tech sector is where the matching ineﬃciencies occur and hence that is
why eﬃciency increases as trade increases.
3.2. Division of surplus and Trade
T ot h i sp o i n tw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tw o r k e r sa n de n t r e p r e n e u r ss h a r eﬁrm output equally.
However, it is clear that any change in the division rule will aﬀect the two entry decisions
and the autarky price. When the two parties share output equally but worker entry costs
are higher than those of entrepreneurs it is not surprising that in equilibrium there is a
surplus of entrepreneurs. Below we demonstrate that there always exists a sharing rule
such that the two equilibrium cut-oﬀ levels are equal, i.e. a∗ = z∗ = x.D e n o t eb yβ the
share of output allocated to entrepreneurs and by β
∗ the value that sets a∗ = z∗ = x.














− γ = P
and
2P =( 1− x)(1 + x − c − γ)








The solution is very intuitive. When the two entry costs are equal we also need to set the
shares allocated to each side equal so that the entry masses of workers and entrepreneurs
are also equal. If entrepreneur entry costs are higher then we need to increase the share
of output allocated to entrepreneurs. The exact amount will depend on the gap between
the two costs and their level.
Two countries that diﬀer in their sharing rules but otherwise identical will have diﬀerent
autarky prices and thus both can beneﬁt by opening to trade. Then we would like to know
how a change in the sharing rule, keeping other things equal, might aﬀect a small open
9economy’s patterns of trade. More speciﬁcally, suppose that we increase the share of
output allocated to entrepreneurs, i.e. β increases. As Table 2 indicates the eﬀect on the
autarky price will depend on the relationship between β and β
∗.10
Table 2: Sharing Rule and the Autarky Price
c =0 .5 γ =0 .6
β α z P
0.3 0.72 0.85 0.015
0.4 0.60 0.69 0.096
0.46489 0.61 0.61 0.161
0.5 0.64 0.58 0.118
0.6 0.78 0.61 0.033
c =0 .5 γ =0 .7
β a z P
0.3 0.74 0.84 0.015
0.4 0.63 0.67 0.095
0.43107 0.63 0.63 0.125
0.5 0.71 0.61 0.058
0.6 0.88 0.77 0.007
When β<β
∗, an increase in the share of output allocated to entrepreneurs results in a
higher autarky price and when β>β
∗ the autarky price falls as β increases . Therefore, the
autarky price reaches its maximum when β = β
∗. This means that it is more likely there is
comparative advantage in the high-tech product when the two masses of entrants are equal.
This is intuitive given that when the two masses of entrants are equal underemployment
and hence, ineﬃciency in the high-tech sector is minimized.
It is also interesting to note that with a variable sharing rule entrepreneurs are not
necessarily on the long-side of the market as a relatively high proportion of output allocated
to them can compensate for higher entry costs. The results in Table 2 suggest that there
is a monotonic eﬀect of a change in the sharing rule on the cut-oﬀ corresponding to the
short-side of the market. So, for example in the case of c =0 .5 and γ =0 .6 as β goes from
0.3 to 0.464899 (increasing the share going to the short side of the market), the cutoﬀ, z
decreases monotonically meaning that more entrepreneurs are entering. When β is greater
than 0.464899 workers are now on the short side of the market. So now as β decreases
from 0.6 to 0.464899 (increasing the share going to the short side of the market) then the
cut-oﬀ for workers, α decreases monotonically meaning that more workers are entering the
market. Hence, this example shows that allocating more output to the short side of the
market increases incentives to enter the matching market. In contrast, the eﬀect on the
10In order to provide a formal proof of the result we need to introduce the general sharing rule β in
the model. Performing comparative statics on the extended model proves to be a very daunting task.
However, we have calibrated the model on the whole parameter space ﬁnding that the conclusions drawn
from Table 2 are robust.
10long-side is ambiguous as we have an additional eﬀect. If the short side of the market has
a declining share then there is less entry on the short side leading to a decrease in the
likelihood a long side agent is matched.
4. Beyond the Benchmark Model
4.1. Skill Complementarity
In this section, we extend the benchmark model by allowing for a more general production
function. More speciﬁcally, we consider the case where the skills of workers and entre-
preneurs are complementary. Now, matched pairs produce (α +z)2 units of the high-tech
product. Without any loss of generality, we are going to restrict our attention to the case
where γ>c . To keep the analysis tractable we are also setting β = 1
2.G i v e n t h e s e
restrictions, once more in equilibrium we must have z∗ <a ∗.
In this case all workers that invest in skills will be matched but only a proportion 1−α∗
1−z∗
of entrepreneurs will ﬁnd employment in the high-tech sector. The equilibrium condition






















1−α∗ is equal to the expected payoﬀ of a matched entrepreneur with ability






1 − z∗ − γ = P (5)
Now, we turn our attention to the goods market equilibrium concentrating again on
the market for the primary commodity. As before, the gross supply is equal to 2α∗.N e x t ,
we derive the gross demand of the primary commodity. As before, the speciﬁcation of
preferences imply that an agent with income y demands an amount
y
2P of the primary
commodity. Agents employed in the primary sector produce one unit and earn income P.
What remains is to derive the demand for the primary commodity by those agents who
are matched.
The combined income of a matched pair comprising of an entrepreneur with ability z
and a worker with ability α is equal to (α + z)2. In order to ﬁnd the expected income
of a matched pair we need to derive the distribution of α + z which is the sum of two
independent, non-identically distributed uniform random variables.11 More speciﬁcally, α
is uniformly distributed on [α∗,1] and z is uniformly distributed on [z∗,1].
11This of course requires that this distribution is the same as the realized distribution resulting from
random matching. Alós-Ferrer (2002) has show that this is indeed the case.
11Lemma 1 The distribution density function of α + z for α∗ >z ∗ is given by
α + z − α∗ − z∗
(1 − α∗)(1 − z∗)
for α
∗ + z





∗ <α+ z 6 1+α
∗ (6)
2 − α − z
(1 − α∗)(1 − z∗)
for 1+α
∗ <α+ z 6 2
Proof Lusk and Wright (1982) provide the derivation when the two random variables are
non-identically but independently uniformly distributed on intervals with a lower
bound equal to 0. For our more general case we apply the following transformation.
Let Z = z − z∗ and A = α − α∗.T h e nZ is uniformly distributed on [0,1 − z∗] and
A is uniformly distributed on [0,(1 − α∗)].A l s oα + z = A + Z + α∗ + z∗.S oi ti s
suﬃcient to ﬁnd the distribution of A + Z.
Using the above density functions we can calculate the expected output of a matched
pair (E{(α+z)2 | α∗ 6 α 6 1,z∗ 6 z 6 1}. It follows that the primary market equilibrium
condition is given by
2a
∗ =
2α∗P − (a∗ − z∗)c +( 1− α∗)(E{(α + z)2 | α∗ 6 α 6 1,z∗ 6 z 6 1} − c − γ)
2P
(7)
The ﬁrst term, on the right-hand side, is equal to the income of all workers employed in the
primary sector. The second term is equal to the total entry costs of those entrepreneurs
who failed to match and the last term is equal to the aggregate income of matched pairs
net of entry costs.
As in the benchmark case, the system of equations (4), (5) and (7) solves for the
three endogenous variables a∗, z∗ and P. This new system is too complex to be analyzed
analytically but numerical calibration of the model shows that the results in Propositions
2 - 5 derived for the benchmark case are also valid when complementarities are present.12
Notice that the qualitative results on the pattern of trade do not depend on the exact
form of the production function. This is because here we are concentrating on cross-
country diﬀerences in market entry costs. As Bougheas and Riezman (2007), Costinot and
Fogel (2009), Grossman and Maggi (2000), Ohnsorge and Treﬂer (2007) and Sly (2010)
have shown, this is not the case anymore when countries also diﬀer in the distribution of
endowments.
4.1.1. Welfare with Skill Complementarity
When the technology is linear what matters for eﬃciency is who gets matched however,
it does not matter with whom they are matched. The reason is that as long as we know
who is matched on each side of the matching market we can ﬁnd aggregate production
12The numerical results are provided in a separate Appendix.
12in that sector by adding their respective ability levels. However, this is not the case
when complementarities are present. Our function is a particular case of a super-modular
function. As Grossman and Maggi (2000) have demonstrated eﬃciency requires that
we match workers and entrepreneurs with identical abilities. Thus, we are going to use
this more general framework to make some observations on the gains from trade and the
pattern of trade. More speciﬁcally, using an example we are going to demonstrate that
(a) trade can lead to welfare losses, and (b) that the pattern of trade may be sub-optimal.
What drives these results is that the competitive equilibrium under autarky is ineﬃcient.
Consider the example: c =0 .5 and γ =0 .6. We measure aggregate welfare by aggregat-
ing individual utilities yielding W =2
√
XY,w h e r eX denotes the level of consumption
of the high-tech product and Y the level of consumption of the primary commodity.13
Aggregate welfare derived in autarky equilibrium, WC









Substituting the above values of entry costs in (4), (5) and (7) we ﬁnd that α∗ =0 .63,
z∗ =0 .5843 and P =0 .42. Finally, substituting these values in the welfare function we
ﬁnd that WC
A =0 .82.
Next, we compare the above solution with aggregate welfare in autarky under a social
planner, WS
A. We begin with the observation that a social planner would set the mass of
workers participating in the matching market equal to the corresponding mass of entre-
preneurs. Let x∗ denote the proportion of agents who decide not to enter the matching
market and let XS
A and Y S
A denote the representative agent’s consumption levels of the
high-tech product and the primary commodity correspondingly. These consumption levels
are equal to the aggregate quantities produced in the economy divided by 2 (given that
















Given that the social planer matches agents of equal ability the ﬁrst term in the brackets
in (9) captures the level of aggregate production of the high-tech product. The second
term is equal to the aggregate cost of entry in the matching market. Equation (10) follows
from the fact that each agent employed in the primary sector produces one unit. After
we substitute (9) and (10) in the welfare function we maximize the latter by choosing the
proportion of agents who will ﬁnd employment in the primary sector to obtain x∗ =0 .69.
Substituting the solution in (9) and (10) and then those solutions in the welfare function
we get XS
A =0 .277, Y S
A =0 .69 and WS
A =0 .8746 > 0.82 = WC
A.
13Keep in mind that the size of the population has measure 2.
14S e ef o o t n o t e6
13The above results show that in autarky the market equilibrium is ineﬃcient which
is not surprising given that the social planner eliminates underemployment (every agent
who incurs the entry cost ﬁnds employment in the high-tech sector) and matches agents
eﬃciently. Furthermore, given that the high-tech sector operates more eﬃciently, optimal
participation in that sector is below the corresponding market equilibrium level.
Next, we consider the corresponding welfare levels under international trade when PT =
0.38 <P=0 .42.G i v e nt h a tt h ei n t e r n a t i o n a lp r i c ei sb e l o wt h ea u t a r k yp r i c et h es m a l l
open economy has a comparative advantage in the high-tech product. By substituting
the international price in (1) and (2) and solving the system we ﬁnd the equilibrium
cut-oﬀ participation rates for the open economy are equal to α∗ =0 .61 and z∗ =0 .56.
Substituting these values and the international price in the right hand side we ﬁnd that
WC
A =0 .81 < 0.82 = WC
A; thus, in this particular case, welfare under international trade
is lower than welfare in autarky. The intuition for this result is that when the economy
opens to trade it expands the sector in which the ineﬃciencies arise and in this particular
case, the costs due to these ineﬃciencies exceed the gains from trading at a price that
diﬀers from the autarky one.
We need to be very careful about interpreting the last result. To see why, let us see what
an a t i o n a ls o c i a lp l a n n e rw o u l dh a v ed o n ew h e n facing the same exogenous international
price. The social planner, in addition to allocating agents to sectors, decides which goods
and what quantities will be traded with the rest of the world. Let τX ≷ 0 and τY ≷ 0
denote the units traded of each good, where positive numbers indicate imports and negative
exports. These quantities must satisfy the trade balance condition
P
TτY = −τX












Substituting the above three conditions in the welfare function and choosing the partici-
pation rate to maximize welfare we obtain τY =0 .024, x∗ =0 .68, XS
T =0 .27, Y S
T =0 .70
and WS
T =0 .875 > 0.8746 = WS
A.15 This demonstrates that if the ineﬃciencies arising in
the matching market are eliminated, trade always improves welfare.
Thus, if matching ineﬃciencies exist our results suggest that imposing trade restrictions
might be welfare improving. However, the results also suggest that a better policy might be
to improve labor and product market institutions thus facilitating more eﬃcient matches.
Once this is done, free trade is the preferred policy. So, it is not international trade that
lowers welfare, rather it is labor market ineﬃciencies that cause welfare to fall in moving
from autarky to free trade.
In the above example the social planner chooses to export the high-tech product and
thus the equilibrium patterns of trade are optimal. But in the absence of a social planner
15Due to the choice of functional forms and parameter values the diﬀerences are small, however, they
are robust in the sence that the qualitative results are obtained for a wide set of parameter values.
14this is not always the case. Consider the following question: what must be the international
price so that the social planner would choose not to trade; i.e. τX = τY =0 ?I ti sc l e a r
that this would be the price that would induce the social planner to choose the same ability
cut-oﬀ level as the one chosen in the case for autarky, i.e. x∗ =0 .69.16 We denote this







2 dx − (c + γ)(1− x∗)
2PS
This is similar to (7) but now we have substituted the corresponding demand for and supply
of the primary commodity given that production is determined by the social planner’s
allocation. Substituting the values for c, γ and x∗ we obtain PS =0 .402. The implication
for trade patterns is that if PT >P S t h e nt h es o c i a lp l a n n e rw o u l dc h o o s et oe x p o r tt h e
primary commodity and if PT <P S t h es oc i a lp l a n n e rw o u l dc h oo s et oe x po r tt h eh i g h - t e c h
product. If the world price, PT lies between the autarky price without a social planner
(P =0 .42) and the social planner’s autarky price (PS =0 .402) then the equilibrium
pattern of trade will not be optimal. So, the interpretation is that matching ineﬃciencies
cause the autarky price to be diﬀerent than if no ineﬃciencies exist. If the world price lies
between these two autarky prices then the pattern of trade is not optimal.
4.2. Alternative Matching Mechanisms
In this section, we examine the robustness of our comparative static results to alternative
matching mechanisms. Up to this point we have assumed that exactly one entrepreneur
(long-side of the market) is matched with one worker leaving the rest of the entrepreneurs to
seek employment in the primary sector. Given our supposition that there is no possibility
of recontracting (inﬁnite search costs) we have assumed matched agents share the surplus
equally. Before we consider any alternative mechanisms we will show that our benchmark
set-up is equivalent to one in which all unmatched entrepreneurs are matched with one
single worker while each one of the rest of the entrepreneurs are matched again with one
worker. The worker who is matched with multiple entrepreneurs is in a strong bargaining
position. Given that the production technology requires a single entrepreneur, bargaining
will push the share of that entrepreneur down to the outside option which in this case is
equal to the price of the primary commodity. Thus, in this new set up, with the exception
of one pair, all other workers and entrepreneurs receive the same payoﬀsa st h o s ei nt h e
original set-up. Now there is one entrepreneur who receives the low payoﬀ and a worker
who receives a payoﬀ that is equal to the total surplus generated by the pair minus the
price of the primary commodity. Given that we have assumed that both populations are
very large the two versions only diﬀer in a set of measure 0.
16This is an application of the second welfare theorem. Suppose that the agents in the economy are
allocated to sectors by the social palnner (this step follows from the fact that the equilibrium allocation
is ineﬃcient) and then exchange goods in competitive markets. The equilibrium price would be the one
that decentralizes the the social planner’s optimal allocation under autarky.
15Now consider the other extreme.17 S u p p o s et h a ta l lw o r k e r s( s h o r t - s i d eo ft h em a r k e t )
are again matched but now some of them are matched with one entrepreneur and some
of them are matched with two entrepreneurs.18 Thus, we now consider the case where
underemployment is more evenly distributed in the economy. To keep this simple, we will
ignore complementarities and focus on the linear technology case. Once more, under the
supposition that c<γthe mass of entrepreneurs who enter the matching market, 1 − z∗,
will be higher than the corresponding mass of workers, 1−α∗. The proportion of workers
matched with two entrepreneurs is equal to α∗−z∗
1−α∗ and the proportion of entrepreneurs
matched with workers who are also matched with another entrepreneur is equal to 2α∗−z∗
1−z∗ .
The equilibrium condition that determines z∗ is given by
2
α∗ − z∗














− c = P (11)
where the left-hand side is equal to the marginal entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ from
























− γ = P (12)
where if the marginal worker is matched with more than one entrepreneur they receive a
payoﬀ equal to the total surplus minus the price of the primary commodity (the entre-
preneur’s outside option) and if matched with a single entrepreneur they receive half the
surplus. Once more, we need the market equilibrium condition (3) to close the model.
Numerical calibration shows that with one exception the comparative static results
under this alternative mechanism are the same as those derived from the benchmark case.19
The only exception relates to the eﬀect of a change in the entry cost of entrepreneurs on
α∗ that determines the mass of workers who enter the matching market. In the benchmark
c a s ew ef o u n dt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee n t r yc o s th a san e g a t i v ee ﬀect on α∗ thus encouraging
the entry of entrepreneurs. This result could be reversed with the alternative matching
mechanism because there is an additional eﬀect. Namely, as the mass of entrepreneurs
entering the matching market declines the likelihood that a worker will be matched with
more than one entrepreneur, and thus receiving the higher payoﬀ, also declines. For less
extreme suppositions about the distribution of underemployment in the economy we would
expect that the outcome would also depend on the level of the two entry costs.
5. Conclusions
Both workers and potential entrepreneurs who want to enter sectors that use advanced
technologies must incur entry costs. For workers these costs might capture time and
17We are indebted to Carl Davidson for suggesting this alternative mechanism.
18Of course, if the measure of entrepreneurs who enter the matching market is more than twice the
measure of corresponding workers then all workers will be matched with multiple entrepreneurs. However,
given our parameter restrictions, this cannot happen in the linear technology case.
19The numerical results are provided in a separate Appendix.
16money spent on skill acquisition while for entrepreneurs these costs might be related to
the establishment of new technologies or more directly to costly procedures related to the
start-up of new enterprises. The decision to incur these costs will depend on expectations
about future beneﬁts from participating in these markets. In turn, these beneﬁts will
depend on the likelihood of ﬁnding a match and thus employment in these markets and
on the productivity of that match. Competitive markets can ensure that ex ante all entry
decisions are optimal but ex post it is very likely that some agents will fail to match
and thus their new skills or know-how will be underemployed. Having argued that such
i m b a l a n c e sa r ec o m m o nw eh a v eb u i l tas i m p l et w o - s e c t o rm o d e lw i t hh e t e r o g e n e o u sa g e n t s
in order to explore their implications for international trade.
Our ﬁrst task has been to explore the impact of a change in market entry costs on
competitiveness and the patterns of international trade. We have found that the results
will depend on three factors. First, on the side of the market that faces the change in
entry costs, second, on the distribution of underemployment in the economy, and third,
on the sharing rule for dividing the surplus generated by a match. More speciﬁcally, we
have found that an increase in the entry costs of the agents on the short-side of the market
will not decrease the competitiveness of that sector. However, the eﬀect of an increase
in the entry costs of the long-side of the market would depend on the distribution of
underemployment in the economy. Furthermore, we have shown that the lower the level
of underemployment, where the latter directly depends on the sharing rule, the higher
the likelihood that the sector’s competitiveness is strong. In order to keep the analysis
simple we have derived these results under the supposition that the matching technology
is such that everyone on the short-side of the market is matched. It seems intuitive that
our results would hold if we also introduce probabilistic matching also on the short-side of
the market.
Calibration has shown that our results also hold when we introduce complementarities
in the production function. However, now in addition to ineﬃciencies arising because of
social sub-optimal entry decisions we also have matching ineﬃciencies. Given that the
autarkic equilibrium is not Pareto optimal it is not surprising that when the economy has
a comparative advantage in the sector aﬀected by those ineﬃciencies, international trade
can be welfare reducing. In fact, we have also demonstrated that even the patterns of trade
can be ineﬃcient. We have also argued that the best policy response is to initiate measures
that improve the functioning of the labor market rather than imposing restrictions on the
cross-border movement of goods.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
























2 − c − γ
¢
− (α − z)c
2α
(A3)
By substituting (A3)i n t o(A1)a n d( A2) we can reduce the above system into two equations























































































4α2(−2+z(1 − 2z)+α(2 − α)) < 0
[The ﬁrst inequality follows from the inequalities z>cand α>γand the fact that
2c(1 − z) is increasing in c. The second inequality follows from the fact that the lower



































































































First, after substituting the partial derivatives of P given above in the the reduced system



















2 +2− (α − z)(1 + 2c) − 2(c + γ)
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2 +1− 3α − 2c(α − z)
¢
Given that α>z>cthe above expression is larger than
1
16α2 (−3α(1 − α)+1 )> 0
where the last inequality follows from 0 <α<1.
Next consider the sign of the second bracket which given that ∂P






2(1 − z)α − α
2(1 − z)2c
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(3 − α +2 ( α − z)) > 0








































where given that α>1
2 is negative.

























































((1 − α)(7α − 3 − 8c)+8 αc)
¾
Notice that if (7α − 3 − 8c) > 0 then the whole expression is positive and the proof is
completed. But even if (7α − 3 − 8c) < 0 then given that α>1
2 the whole expression is
still positive.






































4α(1 − α)+( 1− α)
2 − 4(1 − z)c
¢¾












(α − z) > 0
where the last inequality follows from 0 <z<1.
Proof of Proposition 3

















































































































































4+4 α +2 z +4 cz − 2α





The term in the brackets is equal to
4+α +2 z + α
2 − 4γ − 4c
1 − z
1 − α








the above expression is larger than
3+α
2 − 4γ>3+α
2 − 4α =( 3− α)(1 − α) > 0





























































Given that ∆ > 0 to complete the proof it suﬃces to show that that the diﬀerence of
∆ minus the numerator is positive. This diﬀerence could be positive either because the
numerator is negative or because the numerator is less than ∆. Using the expression for







































Given that the ﬁrst three terms are positive to complete the proof we need to show that
the expression in the brackets is positive. Once more, using results from the proof of






















(1 − α)2(2 + z − 2c − 2γ + α2 +2 zc) − 2α(1 − z)(1 − α +2 c)+






4 − 3α − α







4 − 4γ(1 − α) − α(3 + α)+z(2 + 2c − α − α
2¢
> 0
where the last inequality follows from 1 >α>γ>0.
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